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Abstract
This review explores the legitimacy of the whole brain death
(WBD) criterion. I argue that it does not fulfill the traditional
biologic definition of death and is, therefore, an unsound clinical
and philosophical criterion for death. I dispute whether the clinical
tests used to diagnose WBD are sufficient to prove all critical brain
functions have ceased, as well as examine the sets of brain
functions that persist in many WBD patients. I conclude that the
definition of death must be modified from a biologic to an ontologic
model if we intend to maintain the WBD criterion.
Introduction
Determining death using neurologic criteria, generally
referred to as ‘brain death’, has been accepted for decades
in most developed countries. Despite its ubiquity, however,
the legitimacy of the whole brain death (WBD) criterion
continues to be challenged on clinical and conceptual grounds.
A primary reason for this is that brain dead individuals are at
odds with our traditional intuition about death. Otherwise
stated, the brain dead do not look dead; they are pink and
warm and often perform tasks that corpses cannot. This begs
the fundamental question, are patients who are declared
brain dead really dead?
In this review I argue that, in its current usage, WBD is a
theoretically inconsistent criterion, and that its main premise,
that a functioning brain is required for integrative life, is
flawed. I provide evidence that the bodies of WBD patients
continue to integrate at the level of the organism as a whole
and therefore fail to satisfy the classic definition of death. If
ability to maintain integrated functioning is what distinguishes
life from death, as the current definition of death holds, then I
argue that a dead brain does not stop such functions from
continuing. I conclude the review by arguing for a
modification to the definition of death itself, in which the brain
dead are dead, but not on the merits of the traditional biologic
justification.
Spontaneous life versus assisted life
The brain dead present a peculiar problem in that they are
breathing corpses, which the President’s Commission Report
[1] attempted to explain as follows: ‘When an individual’s
breathing and circulation lack neurologic integration, he or
she is dead.” The President’s Commission established that
artificially maintained respiration and circulation in a WBD
patient are irrelevant because they are controlled by
mechanical intervention rather than by the brain. They
conceded that although it may look as if the patient is alive, in
fact the body is not functioning in any integrated manner
because it is being manipulated externally. Accordingly, they
argue, ‘the function and results are similar, but the source,
cause, and purpose are different between those individuals
with and those without functioning brains.’
We immediately encounter problems if we determine life from
death based on technology if we consider that a person is
not any less alive if he requires an artificial intervention. By its
very definition, life-sustaining treatment serves to sustain life.
Philosopher Hans Jonas [2] asks us to consider whether we
would hesitate to make a dead brain function if it required an
artificial intervention to do so. More likely than not, he
assumes that most people would not care how the brain
continued to function as long as it did so.
The Commission appeared to conflate function with the
mechanism that achieves it [3]. However, there is a difference
between that which sponsors the function (brain) and the
function itself (for instance, respiration, circulation, and so
on), and if it is the function itself that is significant and if it
continues, then it ought not to matter what causes it as long
as it occurs [3]. Both circulation and respiration are diffuse
throughout the body, and brain failure does not stop these
functions. It is true that artificial technology may be required
to support them, but reliance on technology in differentiating
life from death creates intractable problems. These critical
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functions are of the same kind that we require to cease in the
WBD patient, based on the argument that they represent
integration in the organism as a whole. Thus, the biologic
argument for WBD espoused by the President’s Commission
fails as a criterion for death.
The Commission argued that the presence of integration
indicates life and its absence death, but it considered
integration in a WBD patient merely artifact because the
brain does not direct it. Wikler [4] concludes that such a
position requires the Commission to dismiss any activity in a
WBD patient as ‘unintegrated’ unless it is directed by the
brainstem. However, intensive care units (ICUs) employ
apparatus that can perform many functions of the brainstem,
reinforcing the view that the source of integration is irrelevant
provided it can continue. Wikler argues that the Commission
commits the fundamental mistake of confusing necessary
with sufficient conditions. He points out that an intact
brainstem in general means that a patient can breathe
spontaneously, but because WBD patients are capable of
respiration with assistance, this illustrates that brainstem
capacity is not necessary.
Integration or artifact
The President’s Commission defines integration as brain
function that manifests as physiologic homeostasis [5].
Following this definition, then, WBD patients should not be
able to exhibit homeostatic control. It is clear, however, that
some WBD patients will continue to regulate free water
homeostasis through arginine vasopressin, which does not
preclude a determination of WBD. Truog and Fackler [5]
argue that this is more physiologically integrative than
brainstem reflexes such as pupillary constriction, which must
be absent in WBD patients. Thus, using the definition
endorsed by the President’s Commission, some WBD
patients will continue to integrate and do not meet the
requirements of the classic definition of death.
Briefly, some of the integrative functions of the organism as a
whole that are not controlled by the brain include
homeostasis, energy balance, wound healing, infection
fighting, and gestation of a fetus [6]. These are not
characteristics of the dead; they are not reflexes but rather
are evidence of a body that is integrated at the level of the
organism as a whole. What is more disturbing is that these
functions can occur in patients who have passed a WBD
protocol because they are not tested when a determination of
death is made [6]. WBD criteria only test the irreversible
cessation of a portion of intracranial functions. For instance,
the pituitary gland, cardiovascular tone, and thermoregulation
generally are not tested [7].
Halevy and Brody [8] identify two areas of persistent
functioning in some WBD patients that are critically
integrating: neurohormonal regulation, and brain stem
functioning. Furthermore, they argue that cortical function is
present in some WBD patients, and although this is not
required for organic integration, there is general agreement
that declaring someone dead with higher brain functions
intact is unacceptable.
Continued hypothalamic function, in particular, is troubling for
many critics of WBD. When the brain is able to secrete
antidiuretic hormones, it can prevent the development of
central diabetes insipidus, which confirms that the
hypothalamus and posterior pituitary are intact. This is
important because, ‘a functioning neurohormonal pathway is
essential to the viability of the organism as a whole and it is a
major example of the integrative role of the brain.’ [6].
However, many patients who pass WBD protocols do not
exhibit diabetes insipidus and retain residual neurohormonal
regulation, which is readily assessable at the bedside;
according to the most stringent definition of ‘critical’, this
does not indicate mere activity but organized functioning.
Halevy and Brody [8] observe that, ‘neurohormonal regulation
is a component of the integrative role of the brain in
regulating the rest of the body - the very role that is
emphasized in the whole-brain definition of death.’
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that a WBD patient is
not dead arises when such a patient successfully gestates a
fetus to term. A 2003 article published in Critical Care
Medicine [9] reviewed 10 such cases of women who passed
WBD protocols and who were supported in ICUs in order to
bring their fetuses to term. The longest period a WBD patient
spent on life-sustaining treatment was in a woman who was
15 weeks pregnant at the time of admission and required
support for 107 days. Surprisingly, the authors noted that,
‘The clinical problems found in those women were similar to
other long-term patients in ICU.’ Clearly, this comparison with
other ICU patients implies that these women were not
corpses according to the traditional biologic definition of
death.
It is clear from the discussion thus far that WBD patients can
be maintained on life-sustaining treatment for much longer
than was originally postulated, but the fact remains that such
a claim was merely prognostic in nature and not a legitimate
way to determine that death had already occurred [10].
Shewmon and others admit that total brain destruction is
predictive of death but refer to extensive empirical evidence
to prove that the organism as a whole, though disabled, is not
yet dead [10,11].
The fundamental problem is that WBD has been imposed
upon society by appealing to an unsound biologic argument;
WBD attempts to fulfill the definition of death as the
permanent cessation of the integrated functioning of the
organism as a whole despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. At the conclusion of this paper it should be clear
that WBD patients are not yet dead on the biologic merits of
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Conclusion
I suggest that the definition of death be amended from a
purely biologic model to an ontologic definition that focuses
on that which is essential to the human person, the loss of
which constitutes death. In this regard, the justification for
death is not argued on purely organic terms, because the
body can continue to integrate despite a dead brain;
furthermore, a strictly biologically oriented approach fails to
capture that which distinguishes humans from other animals.
An ontologic definition will rest on the agreement that the
human brain possesses unique functions and capacities,
which are significant to the nature of the human person to the
extent that when the individual has irreversibly lost such
capacities he or she is dead.
There is a difference between biologic life and human life.
Cessation of the latter occurs when one has irreversibly lost
the capacity for consciousness or ‘personhood’, despite
persistence of the former. Although I endorse an ontologic
definition, I do not advocate a higher brain death (HBD)
criterion (sometimes referred to as neocortical death)
because of the inability to quantify clinically the loss of such
human properties, capacities, and functions. Therefore,
revising the definition of death will not require us to discard
the WBD criterion, which, as a purely practical matter,
continues to work for society despite its shortcomings
(although it may be supplanted by other criteria as medicine
improves). As Youngner and Bartlett [12] note, the various
criteria used to fulfill the definition of death are determined by
the current medical and technical armamentarium, but the
definition itself, at the philosophical level, will remain constant.
This philosophical shift allows the WBD criterion to be
maintained in order to fulfill our new definition of death until
tests for HBD gain greater specificity, because all those who
meet WBD will necessarily meet HBD. In so doing we
recognize not only the need for a defensible concept of
death, because the current use of WBD rests on the faulty
premises that a functioning brain is required for integrative life
and that any functions that are not regulated by the brain are
necessarily unintegrated, but also the need for clinical
confidence. I began by claiming that WBD patients are not
dead according to the traditional definition of death. I
conclude with the assertion that WBD patients are dead if we
adopt a new definition of death, one that focuses on the
irreversible loss of consciousness as that which is essential
to the human person, the loss of which portends death.
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